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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1954 TERM
become joint tenants with the right of survivorship, and with the further right in
each of them to terminate the joint ownership and create a tenancy in common
by conveying his or her interest to a third party.58 The presumption as to the
husband-to-wife transfer was seen as a vestige of the common law rule that a
husband owned all his wife's personality, and that thus, when he purported to pass
to her an interest in his own personality, he could not have intended to give her
anything greater than a right of survivorship. 57 Since this historical theory is seen
as having no impact on a modern-day transfer, the court refused to extend the
presumption applicable in a husband-to-wife transfer to a wife-to-husband transfer,
in the absence of proof that the actual intent was to establish a right of survivorship
only.
The dissenters would have enlarged the coverage of the presumption, so that
proof of a gift by the wife of property solely belonging to her would make out a
prime facie case of a joint tenancy, with a right of exclusive present enjoyment in
the wife and a right of survivorship in the husband. Fairness was seen as dictating
equal treatment for married women, especially when there was no reason for
establishing a double standard. The historical theory argument was rejected, since
the presumption was seen as based on the lack of consideration.58 If the majority's
decision is merely a step in the removal of the vestigial presumption admittedly an
anomaly in the law of property, then it certainly is justifiable. However, if the
presumption is to be retained in the husband-to-wife transfer, then the majority
can be credited only with the creation of a new source of confusion by applying a
double standard based solely on which spouse transfers the property.
Conflicts-Domestic Relations
Where a contractual transaction has elements in different jurisdictions, the
New York courts have used various approaches to determine which law is to be
applied: that of the jurisdiction where the contract was made; that of the place of
performance; that intended by the parties; or that of the jurisdiction in which are
grouped the significant contacts.59 The Restatement of Conflict of Laws states
that the law of the place of making should govern the validity of the contract and
56. Matter of Suter's Estate, 258 N. Y. 104, 179 N. E. 310 (1932).
57. West v. McCullough, supra, note 50.
58. 308 N. Y. at 523, 127 N. E. 2d at 320: "Surely an inquiry into who paid the
consideration has not the rights under the slightest relation to married women's
property rights under the common law. Rather it seeks a clue as to the donor's
intent. Without proof of different intent, it can not be assumed that such donors
intended to give their spouses such control over the donated asset that he or she
may alienate one half of it without the permission of the spouse who supplied the
sole consideration for the asset. Such an assumption ignores the unity of the
marital relationship."
59. See Jones v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 158 Misc. 466, 286 N. Y.
Supp. 4 (1936), for a partial review of the cases.
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the capacity of the parties to enter into the agreement, while the law of the place
of performance should govern all matters connected with its performance.00 This
position has been widely criticized, and the grouping of contacts theory is
advocated by many authorities. 61
In Auten v. Aten 62 the Court came out somewhat strongly for this latter
theory. Husband and wife were citizens, domiciliaries and residents of England.
They were married in 1917 and had two children. In 1931 the husband deserted
his wife and children and came to the United States, settling in New York. In
1933 the wife came to New York and there negotiated a separation agreement
with the husband; he was to pay a fixed amount per month to a trustee in New
York for the benefit of the wife and children, who were to continue to reside
in England. The wife then returned to England, and the husband neglected to
make the payments to the trustee. In 1934 the wife instituted a suit in England
for separation, which never came to trial.
In the present action the wife sued under the separation agreement. The
husband moved for summary judgment, which was granted on the ground that,
under New York law, the wife's institution of her suit for separation in England
acted as a repudiation of the separation agreement. The Appellate Division affirmed
the dismissal, and granted leave to amend. 3 On this appeal, the Court reversed
and remanded, on the ground that English and not New York law controls. After
discussing the Restatement rules, the Court explained the advantage of the
grouping of contacts theory-that by choosing the law of the place having the
most significant contacts with the matter in dispute, it allows the forum to apply
the policy of the jurisdiction most intimately concerned with the outcome of the
litigation and also to give effect to the probable intention of the parties. Applying
this contact theory, the Court found that England had all the truly significant
contacts with the matter in dispute, and that England was the jurisdiction with the
greatest concern in defining the rights and duties of the parties under the
agreement.
Unfortunately, from the point of view of clarifying New York law on choice
of law problem, the Court went on to "note" that if the approach of the Restate-
ment were used, English law would also control. Since repudiation is an aspect
of performance, whether or not the wife repudiated would be determined by the
60. RESTATEMENT, CONFLIeT OF LAWS, § 332 (1934).61. Page, Choice of Law Problems in Direct Action against Indemnfiication
Insurers, 3 UTAH L. REV. 490, 498-499 (1953); Nussbaum, Conflict Theories of
Uontracts; Cases versus Restatement, 51 YALE L. J. 893 (1942); Cook, Contracts
and the Conflict of Laws: Intention of the Parties, 32 ILL. L. REV. 899 (1938).
62. 308 N. Y. 155, 124 N. E. 2d 99 (1954).
63. 281 App. Div. 740, 117 N. Y. S. 2d 881 (lst Dep't 1953).
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law of England, the place of her performance. In other New York cases in which
the grouping of contacts theory has been used, the more conventional approaches
were also shown to lead to the same result. Judge Shientag, in Jones v. Metro-
politan Life Insurance Co.0 4 performed a judicial tour de force by showing that
by any theory-place of contracting, place of performance, place intended, and
grouping of contacts-an insurance policy was a New York contract. The Jones
case illustrates more clearly than the instant case the dangers involved in the
application of the grouping of contacts theory, that the judge will select as the
significant contacts those which point to the result which he desires.65 But it also
shows that the more conventional approaches of place of making and place of
performance are easily amenable to "interpretation" in the interests of justice.
It has been suggested"6 that the decided cases really apply the contacts
theory, and use place of making, place of performance and intention of the parties
as the significant contacts. As the New York Annotations to the Restatement of
Conflicts states,6 7 the law of New York is unsettled in this area. It probably will
not be settled until the Court of Appeals is forced to decide which law governs
when the place of significant contacts is found to be different from the place
of making or performance. Whatever the center of gravity, it is, like the quest
of the "proper" law, an approach which does not lead to absolute predictability;
but does such an absolute predictability exist at all? May not an industrious
lawyer's predictions as to facts to which the courts will look in finding the
center of gravity be more than a mere guess? Will not such an approach be more
reliable, even from the standpoint of predictability, than the old conceptualistic
factors such as place of making or performance? Who knows whether the
conceptualistic construction of choice of law will induce a court to prefer a connec-
tion of the case with the place of performance to that of the place of contact, or
vice versa? The confusion dominant in New York under the sway of those old
concepts has certainly not been increased by the approval shown by the Court of
Appeals to the grouping of contacts test, and this alone points to some progress
in the conflict law of New York.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Zoning, Non-Conforming Use
A non-conforming use of real property will be permitted to continue, not-
withstanding the contrary provisions of an otherwise valid zoning ordinance
64. 158 Misc. 466, 286 N. Y. Supp. 4 (1936).
65. Cf. Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N. Y. 288, 113 N. E. 2d 424 (1953).
66. NussmAuM, op. cit. sulpra note 61.
67. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws, N. Y. Annotations §332 (1935).
